China plans to blow Starlink out of the sky in a Taiwan war

China’s bold moves to counter Starlink’s military applications with state-of-the-art satellite jamming methods highlight the critical role space would play in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Chinese scientists have developed a method to target SpaceX’s Starlink satellite constellation. According to SCMP, the method simulates a space operation that could reach nearly 1,400 Starlink satellites within 12 hours using 99 Chinese satellites.

The study, led by Wu Yunhua, director of the Department of Aerospace Control at Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, was published in the Chinese journal Systems Engineering and Electronics and highlights Starlink’s military applications as seen in the Ukraine War .

The Chinese team’s computer simulation suggests that China could effectively track and monitor the operational status of the Starlink satellites, which are equipped with lasers, microwaves and other reconnaissance and tracking devices. The SCMP report notes that the method uses a new binary AI algorithm to mimic the hunting strategy of whales.

Wu’s team claims to have developed unprecedented technology that allows computers in the ground control center to create a comprehensive and reliable action plan in less than two minutes.

It also said the research received significant funding from the Chinese government and military, with the Harbin Institute of Technology also involved in the project.

Asia Times has previously reported that China is reportedly developing anti-satellite technologies to counter the perceived military threat posed by the Starlink network, which has demonstrated its strategic utility in Ukraine by enabling real-time coordination on the battlefield.

Chinese researchers advocate “soft and hard kill methods” to neutralize Starlink’s decentralized constellation, which enables stable communications across over 2,300 satellites.

Targeting individual Starlink satellites is considered inefficient; Instead, China has been exploring disruptive technologies, including the Relativistic Klystron Amplifier (RKA), a high-power microwave weapon that can disable sensitive satellite electronics. However, deploying such systems comes with challenges, including satellite overheating and energy requirements.

In addition, China has developed sophisticated directed-energy weapons such as satellite-mounted solid-state lasers and is exploring the potential of X-ray lasers—ideas that originated in the U.S.’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—to take out multiple satellites in one attack. This approach aims to reverse the imbalance between costs and replacement of traditional anti-satellite weapons.

The reason for these programs is Starlink’s proven military benefits, such as increasing the data speed of U.S. drones and stealth fighters by a hundredfold, and its critical role in Ukraine’s battle successes, including the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva.

China’s focus on such technologies reflects a broader strategy to weaken Starlink’s capabilities and maintain superiority in space, particularly in scenarios such as a Taiwan conflict.

Juliana Suess points to Starlink’s effectiveness in the Ukraine war and mentions in a January 2023 article for the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) that Taiwan, inspired by Ukraine, is developing its satellite communications system in low Earth orbit (LEO).

Suess says the project, announced by Taiwan’s space agency in December 2022, aims to give Taiwan a sovereign ability to communicate independently in the event of a Chinese invasion.

She notes that the system is designed to ensure resilience against potential attacks on Taiwan’s submarine cables, which currently form the backbone of its external communications.

In a July 2024 report for the Stanford Cyber ​​Policy Center, Charles Mok and Kenny Huang highlight the vulnerability of Taiwan’s undersea cables, which the island relies on for its internet connectivity.

Mok and Huang point out that Taiwan operates 15 undersea cables that carry over 99% of the world’s data and connect it to international digital networks. However, location in an earthquake-prone region and proximity to geopolitical tensions increases the risk of accidental or intentional cable damage.

They note that recent cable-cutting incidents near Taiwan, allegedly involving Chinese ships, have raised concerns about possible digital blockages. They point out that repairing submarine cables is time-intensive and limited global repair fleets are exacerbating delays.

In keeping with the vulnerabilities of Taiwan’s undersea cable infrastructure, The War Zone reported this month that Taiwanese authorities have accused a Chinese ship, the Shunxin-39, of cutting an undersea communications cable near the port of Keelung.

According to War Zone, the incident is the latest in a series of similar events affecting Taiwan’s underwater infrastructure. The report said the Shunxin-39, which is registered in Cameroon but owned by a Hong Kong company headed by a Chinese national, operates under multiple identities, raising suspicions of deliberate sabotage.

According to the report, Taiwan’s coast guard attempted to intercept the ship for examination, but rough weather prevented boarding. It is then mentioned that the ship continued its journey to South Korea, where the Taiwanese authorities requested assistance in the investigation.

According to War Zone, the damaged cable, part of the Trans-Pacific Express network, is critical to connecting East Asia to the West Coast of the United States. The report said communications were rerouted despite minimal disruption, but the incident highlights the vulnerability of Taiwan’s underwater infrastructure.

While satellites do not suffer from such vulnerabilities, Mok and Huang are an inadequate replacement for submarine cables due to their high cost and lower data capacity.

Additionally, in a November 2024 report for the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Marc Julienne mentions that Taiwan’s LEO satellite program, while ambitious, faces several key challenges.

First, Julienne points out that dependence on foreign partners for satellite launches highlights the lack of domestic launch capability, which represents a significant obstacle to achieving full space power status. Although plans for autonomous launch vehicles are in place, he says progress remains slow and test flights are not scheduled until 2028.

Second, he said, the limited experience of Taiwan’s traditional space actors in space-based communications and the lack of satellite communications expertise within the industrial base have hampered efforts to develop a domestically controlled LEO broadband satellite constellation.

Julienne said these challenges are compounded by Taiwan’s geographical and geopolitical vulnerabilities, such as its reliance on undersea cables for internet connectivity, which are vulnerable to natural disasters and potential sabotage by adversaries.

He mentions that Taiwan’s efforts to improve “communications resilience” through satellite constellations are essential but require significant investment in financial and human capital. But he says Taiwan’s emerging space sector is struggling to attract and retain talent, with many engineers preferring higher-paying opportunities in the semiconductor industry or working abroad.

Finally, Julienne says that managing the geopolitical sensitivities of space development, particularly by maintaining civilian oversight and avoiding provocative military applications, adds complexity to Taiwan’s ambitions.