Snacking booths from Stubhub’s latest IPO

WELT: Meet “Stub”. This is the proposed ticker symbol for Stubhub, the ticketing marketplace, which applied for a first public offer on March 22nd. The exact date, on which Stubhub may not have been included in the securities and Exchange Commission, was not the potential share price.

The IPO entry rated Stubhub with more than 16 billion US dollars, which brought up eyebrows in the ticketing world, partly because Viagogo acquired the company in February 2020 for $ 4.05 billion from Ebay. One of the best competitors of Stubhub in the ticketing area – Seatgeek – had a value of 1 billion US dollars in 2022 after the plans were published via SPAC.

Greg Bettinelli, who was involved in the takeover of Stubhub from 2007 by Ebay, asked whether the company was more worth more than bought it in 2020, partly because of the debt burden on Stubhub and a lack of profitability.

“It still has an enormous amount of secondary card categories exposure. You have not got involved in the primary side in the ticket distribution business.

“It is definitely a business with several billion dollars, but how many multis? I will have others find out.”

The submission offers a rare view of the financial performance of Stubhub at a time when it rose from a hole that was created by a series of unfortunate circumstances that began with the takeover of Viagogo and in November 2019 (probably) in February 2020. The deal marked the triumphant, the Stubhub of Stubhub from one of the Greater and Curw owner caper and Curo baker, which with the wake -up and the current CEO, and the ascent and the recovery, in which the case was the case, and the ascent and the current CEO mix, which, as he was in 2006, was the spacer in 2006 that was up and down. Viegogo in Europe.

The time of work was unhappy. First, the deal was frozen by the British competitive and marketing authority in Great Britain for 18 months. The examination of the deal by the CMA kept Stubhub and Viagogo separated during the highlight of pandemic, one of the worst period in the history of the live entertainment industry before the deal was finally approved in September 2021.

Stubhub increases 29.5% after the acquisition of income compared to the previous year in 2024. The company sold more than 40 million tickets, with more than one million unique sellers using the platform. The gross sales sales of Stubhub (GMS is the total value of the dollar that buyers paid for ticket transactions and fulfillment last year) reached an increase of 81.3% compared to 2022 (4.8 billion US dollar), the year in which the company began its relaxation.

However, Stubhub continues to have significant $ 2.3 billion $ 2.3 billion debt (its terms for the term of loans in 2030)-, which result from the acquisition of Viagogo and the aggressive expenditure on the reconciliation of the market share after 2021 and the new direct instructions of the company. Stubhub paid interest payments of $ 179.8 million in the financial year 2024 compared to USD $ 119.7 million in 2022. Moody’s ratings estimated the company’s adjusted lever in 2025.

The company has 255 million US dollars on Free Cashflow and could use the proceeds from any IPO to pay the company’s debt. The ratings of Moody were missing some important information and recorded the IPO as positive for Stubhub, since “if the IPO will be successful, the transparency provides transparency in terms of financial reporting for Stubhub as a public company and can reduce the leverage effect.”

The submission also illuminates the Direct emission ticking targets from Stubhub. The company has almost invented the digital sales market for ticketing, but also converted into the direct edition and worked with the teams to make the first sale of tickets from your ticket intervention. Stubhub (which functions in North America and internationally as a Stubhub) already offers direct tickets for NBA, MLB and European Soccer Properties as well as music artists and festivals and in 2024 exceeded $ 100 in GMS. More than 30% of the World Series Games participants in New York Last October bought their tickets on the secondary market or sales with a direct edition via the Stubhub marketplace.

Stubhub does not require the exclusivity of right -wing owners, even if it provides teams and artists an additional global sales channel. Imagine this strategy pointed to the FIFA men of the FIFA men and the LA28 summer games.

Nevertheless, Stubhub’s growing interest in direct exhibition cards for some in the ticketing world does not make sense, partly that the primary ticket market competition – Ticketmaster, AXS and Seatgeek – is significant.

“You will find the same problems someone else has,” said Dave Wakeman from Wakeman Consulting Group. “I’m looking for sustainable competitive advantage. I don’t see anything there. Everything is the same; it is a” I, also “product.”

The company of the company, which she observed as a strength in the IPO submission, is less and less important in the ticketing world today, since the payment for the search for the company becomes more central. Stubhub’s sales and marketing costs rose by 60% last year, an increase of $ 317 million of advertising costs due to online marketing and the diversification of channels with which sales increase.

“You could argue that investing in your brand doesn’t make much sense at that time,” said Wakeman, “and that comes from me, who teaches people about brands.”

In the IPO registration, the self-proclaimed lack of financial reporting of the company is also known, and the control baker would transmit a listed stub stroke, including 90.4% of the voice power, although only 5.2% of class A-share was held. In the company’s two-class stock structure, Baker has a crucial 100% of the class B shares that emit a hundred votes for every class A share. Madrone Capital Partners (27.1%) West Cap Management (11%), Bessemer Venture Partners (9.6%), Pointstate Capital (5.6%) and declaration partners (5.3%) are the best holders of class A.

Baker’s control over Stubhub is not entirely unusual for companies managed by the founders. Phil Knight and his family, for example, control almost all Nike voting departments.

In view of the type of fall of the company in 2006, it is not surprising. The company’s charter documents also contain a number of anti-takeover regulations that ensure that Baker does not get out of Stubhub again. From the submission: “Anti-Takeover regulations in our charter documents could make our company more difficult. Limit our shareholders’ attempts to replace or remove our current management and limit the market price of our regular shares in class A.”