What can Latin America’s failed presidencies teach current leaders?

CONCEPCIÓN, Chile — In Latin America, completing a presidency is still an achievement in itself: More than 20 presidents have failed to do so since the early 1980s. In recent years, the mandates of Guillermo Lasso of Ecuador and Pedro Castillo of Peru have been shortened. An impeachment motion was recently filed against Argentine Javier Milei, but it had little chance of success. Peruvian Dina Boluarte has so far dodged five opposition requests to oust her in a deeply divided Congress.

Why do some presidents survive turmoil while others fall? As I argue in my new book, the key seems to lie in the strength of political parties: when a country’s parties are very strong or very weak, presidencies often survive. When they find themselves in the middle, alliances become fragile, ambitions become short-sighted, and a president’s fate can hang in the balance.

To explain, presidents can sometimes stay in office when parties are too weak to challenge them. Conversely, strong parties may have the political power to unseat an incumbent president, but they may also value institutional continuity in times of crisis because they are able to think about the long-term political consequences of their actions.

Unless parties are particularly weak or strong, presidents often stay in office because of temporary, unstable alliances. When these alliances fail, for example due to a corruption scandal or a presidential power grab, the parties may both be organized enough to challenge a president and lack the long-term perspective to prevent a crisis from escalating. Taken together, this poses a higher risk to the president’s survival.

Practical applications

Take Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru, all countries where parties are relatively weak but whose presidents have achieved wildly different results. While Rafael Correa (Ecuador) and – for much of his term – Alberto Fujimori (Peru) managed to consolidate power, Pedro Castillo (Peru) and Fernando Lugo (Paraguay) had to dramatically shorten their presidencies due to a lack of partisan support, weak governing parties and Short-termism.

Where parties’ institutional strength is mediocre, parties lack long-term horizons while also being unable to muster the support needed to unseat an incumbent president. The cases of Argentine Peronism in 2001 and the Brazilian opposition in 2016 show that parties can communicate and coordinate with grassroots organizations and protesters to mount successful attempts to unseat the chief executive. Bolivia only has one strong party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party founded by Evo Morales. This dominance made the opposition weak and prevented effective negotiations and solutions during the November 2019 crisis. As the book shows, the lack of a structured opposition made it impossible for Morales to negotiate or defuse the crisis, which ultimately contributed to his forced resignation . Without strong and credible opponents, presidents lack dialogue partners, increasing the likelihood of an abrupt end.

Conversely, political organizations in countries with highly institutionalized parties, such as Chile, have long-term horizons and prefer a certain minimum level of cooperation. Chilean Senator Jaime Quintana noted that party leaders ultimately side with the president because “the cost of betraying a government to which they have sworn loyalty is too high.” This long-term perspective keeps parties from abandoning their leaders in difficult times.

Lessons for Current Leaders in Argentina and Peru

Let’s return to the first cases of Javier Milei in Argentina and Dina Boluarte in Peru. Milei, an outsider candidate from the newly founded La Libertad Avanza party, does not have a majority in Congress. Fortunately for him, Milei was not involved in scandals, a factor largely associated with presidential failures. However, as the president of a country with moderate party strength, there are parties that could successfully limit his power. Specifically, he faces a formidable and organized opposition in the form of the Peronists.

The Peronists, known for their close ties to civil society and their ability to mobilize protests, could pose a significant challenge to Milei’s presidency and lead to a premature end, especially if Argentina’s economy deteriorates. Without strong party support, Milei is vulnerable to legislative challenges and especially street protests.

On the other hand, Boluarte, also a minority president, has weathered several waves of anti-government protests and attempts by Congress to oust him. The so-called “Rolex case” scandal has taken a toll on Boluarte’s personal approval (she denies wrongdoing), and she is viewed by many Peruvians as a “usurper” for her political involvement since taking office after Castillo was deposed following his failure Self-coup in 2022 has perceived changes.

However, the opposition Boluarte faces is fragmented and Peru’s economy remains relatively stable. Its survival so far is due to the weakness of the opposition parties, but this also means that it lacks strong partners to govern effectively. Previous Peruvian presidents such as Pedro Pablo Kuczynski and Martín Vizcarra were deposed despite favorable economic conditions, showing how political fragmentation can undermine even economically successful governments.

Leaders in Latin America would do well to recognize that while personal charisma and anti-establishment rhetoric can win elections, effective governance and persistence in office requires building or collaborating with strong political organizations. The durability of a presidency is closely related to the ability of parties to promote party cohesion, maintain long-term goals, and work constructively with allies and the opposition. However, presidents cannot expect these conditions to change dramatically. Rather, they must learn to play with the cards they are dealt.

Tags: Dina Boluarte, Javier Milei, presidential politics

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of America Quarterly or its editors.